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I. INTRODUCTION
In July 2012 the United Kingdom promulgated a new immigration rule
requiring legal residents wishing to sponsor the entry of a foreign spouse to
provide proof of access to an annual gross income of £18,600 (approximately
$24,800), and additional savings of £16,000 (approximately $21,300).1 Such
a rule raises questions about how and when domestic immigration policies
intersect and come into conflict with the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR or the Convention).2 An inability to meet these income
requirements has resulted in the separation of families, many with small
children.3
In June 2013 the BBC reported the story of Douglas Shillinglaw and his
family.4 Because he cannot meet the new financial requirements, Mr.
Shillinglaw is unable to reunite with his five-month-old son, his Nigerian
wife, and his wife’s six-year-old son from a previous relationship.5 Mr.
Shillinglaw is self-employed, and although he claims he has no problems
paying his bills and mortgage, he is unable to sufficiently demonstrate to the
Home Department he will be able to meet the financial income
requirements.6 Mr. Shillinglaw also commented that the rules do not take
into consideration the fact that he has family in the U.K. who would step in
and help care for his wife and their children should anything happen to him.7
Further, MM v. Secretary of the Home Department, a case decided in July
2013, presents the stories of three lawful U.K. residents who are unable to
sponsor visas for foreign family members due to a lack of sufficient income.
The MM plaintiffs each presented the Court with slightly different
circumstances rendering them incapable of meeting the £18,600 per-yearincome requirement. The first plaintiff, MM, is a Lebanese refugee working
1

Immigration Rules, Appendix FM, §§ E-ECP.3.1(a)–(b) (U.K.).
See MM v. Sec. of State for the Home Dep’t [2013] EWHC (Admin.) 1900, [65]–[85]
(Eng.) (providing a discussion of domestic and Human Rights Court cases challenging
immigration rules on the basis of their violating the European Convention on Human Rights’
guarantee of respect for private and family life) [hereinafter MM].
3
Id. at [2]–[21] (describing three families unable to live together in the U.K. as a result of
the U.K. resident being unable to meet financial minimums).
4
UK’s New Visa Rules ‘Causing Anguish’ for Families, BBC NEWS (June 10, 2013), http://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-22833136; see also UK Spouse Immigration Rules ‘Unjustified,’ High
Court Says, BBC NEWS (July 5, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-23198144.
5
See UK’s New Visa Rules ‘Causing Anguish’ for Families, supra note 4.
6
Id. (“Self-employed income is different from employed income. I have got enough
money to pay my mortgage and bills, and that should be enough.”).
7
Id. (“And should anything happen to me I have a family who will take care of them. My
family are wholeheartedly behind what I am doing.”).
2
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toward his Ph.D. at a British university.8 He is thirty-four and married to a
Lebanese national who has a Bachelor of Science degree in nutrition and
works in Lebanon as a pharmacist.9 Further, MM’s wife is fluent in
English.10 Despite both MM and his wife clearly being qualified for a
number of well-paying jobs, MM cannot meet the threshold requirement.
MM takes particular issue with the rules for two reasons: (1) he cannot cite
to his wife’s potential earning capacity to help meet the required threshold,
and (2) he cannot rely on familial support, even when that support is
documented by a covenant deed.11
The second MM plaintiff is Abdul Majid, a British citizen who has lived
in the U.K. since 1972.12 Mr. Majid’s wife, whom he married in 1991, lives
in Pakistan.13 The couple has five children, four of whom have lived in the
U.K. since 2001.14 Although Mr. Majid’s wife has been admitted to the U.K.
for limited stays over the course of their marriage, she has now been
indefinitely denied entry because of her husband’s lack of income.15 Mr.
Majid’s chief complaint with the rules is that they separate his wife from the
couple’s children.16
The third and final complainant in MM is Shabana Javed. Mrs. Javed is a
British citizen who has limited work skills and who has been unable to find
work above the £18,600 threshold. Because she cannot find work that pays
above the threshold, she cannot sponsor the entry of her husband, who
currently works as a civil servant in Pakistan.17 Mrs. Javed has the same
complaints as MM, but, in addition, argues the rules unjustifiably
discriminate against British-Asian women.18
Circumstances like those of Mr. Shillinglaw and the plaintiffs in MM
implicate and demand the analysis of the convergence of domestic
immigration law and the ECHR. The U.K. adopted the ECHR in 1998 when
Parliament voted to pass the Human Rights Act.19 Due to this domestic
8

MM, [2013] EWHC (Admin.) 1900, [4].
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at [7]–[8].
12
Id. at [13].
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at [14].
16
Id. at [16].
17
Id. at [17]–[19].
18
Id. at [20]–[21] (explaining “socio-economic data demonstrates that this segment of
society [British Asian women] suggests from significantly lower rates of pay or employment
than others, notably men”).
19
Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, sched. 1 (Eng.).
9
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legislation, the U.K. is bound to respect the rights contained in the ECHR,
which the Human Rights Act mirrors. Therefore, if a U.K. immigration rule
violates a right guaranteed to U.K. citizens by way of the Human Rights Act
of 1998, it can be struck down “by the Administrative Court exercising its
supervisory function in judicial review proceedings.”20
The interplay between this particular immigration rule and the Human
Rights Act (the Act) is especially significant because the rule’s legality is
being challenged under Article 8 of the Act.21 Article 8 of the Act
guarantees a right to respect for family and private life.22 It further states:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.23
In recent years the European Court of Human Rights (the Strasbourg
Court) has broadened the scope of the protection provided to nuclear families
by Article 8 of the ECHR.24 Therefore, given the fact immigration rules are
tightening in the U.K. while the Strasbourg Court is concurrently redefining
what protections the ECHR guarantees, the question arises: where do British
courts and legislators go from here? Is this rule requiring lawful U.K.
residents to produce proof of significant annual income and personal savings
assets truly necessary to ensure British taxpayers are not burdened by
immigration? And what duties does the British government owe to noncitizens related to lawful U.K. residents in light of the Strasbourg Court’s
expanding interpretation of Article 8? The answers to these questions will
impact not only families currently separated because of the financial
requirements, but will also impact the future of immigration regulation in
Europe as a whole.

20

MM v. Sec. of State for the Home Dep’t, [2013] EWHC (Admin.) 1900 [40] (Eng.).
Id.
22
Human Rights Act, supra note 19, art. 8 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”).
23
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as
amended by Protocol No. 11, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
24
Daniel Thym, Respect for Private and Family Life Under Article 8 ECHR in Immigration
Cases: A Human Right to Regularize Illegal Stay?, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 87, 88 (2008).
21
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This Note will focus on the recent MM decision and use this opinion as
the basis for analyzing the intersection of the ECHR and domestic
immigration law.25 Additionally, there will be a thorough discussion of
recent decisions by the Strasbourg Court analyzing the extent to which
Article 8 provides an avenue of attack against immigration laws restricting
the ability of families to reunite and live together in European countries.
First, this Note provides a discussion and overview of both the current
state of European law, i.e., case law coming from the Strasbourg Court on
the subject of Article 8, and of current U.K. case law interpreting and
applying Article 8. Second, this Note explains how the current financial
requirement works and provides an overview of the government’s stated
intentions for enacting the new financial requirement. Third, this Note
analyzes the proportionality of the current financial requirements. Finally,
this Note argues that European legislatures, domestic courts, and the
Strasbourg Court should protect the recently developed expansive view of
Article 8 protection for families. Further, because immigration policy
addressing family life and reunification can so easily run afoul of rights
guaranteed in the ECHR, this Note advocates for immigration rules and
policies allowing for a more individualized, case-by-case assessment of
whether a lawful resident should be allowed to sponsor the entry of a foreign
family member.
II. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IMMIGRATION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS CASE LAW
The modern British immigration system, as opposed to the system of
immigration that existed during the time of the British Empire, began with
the passage of the 1971 Immigration Act.26 The 1971 Immigration Act
established categories of Commonwealth patrials and non-patrials.27 In other
words, the U.K. recognized traditional citizen and non-citizen distinctions,
and placed immigration rules and burdens on those individuals falling into
the non-citizen category.28 Non-patrials, or non-citizens could not enter the
Thus began the British system of complex
U.K. without leave.29
immigration rules governing who can and cannot enter the country, and who
25

MM v. Sec. of State for the Home Dep’t, [2013] EWHC (Admin.) 1900 (Eng.).
Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 471, 474 (1985).
27
Id.
28
VAUGHAN BEVAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH IMMIGRATION LAW 114 (1986)
(“[P]atriality was used to describe those who were free from immigration control.”).
29
Abdulaziz, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 474.
26
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can and cannot act as an entry sponsor for non-citizens living abroad. From
early on, many U.K. immigration rules did not apply equally to all foreign
citizens.30 This remains true today. Individuals who are citizens of other
European Union countries, for example, do not have to meet work permit
requirements in order to enter the U.K. for long periods of time.31 All other
non-European Union nationals, however, do have to meet the requirements
set out in the immigration rules.32
These “rules,” are subject to judicial review because they work in practice
as delegated legislation creating legal rights and obligations.33 A British
court will be able to review these rules using a proportionality test.34 Thus, if
a court holds that the rules present a disproportionate infringement on human
rights when viewed in light of the government’s stated policy goal (i.e.,
ensuring U.K. citizens and residents sponsoring the immigration of a foreign
national family member do not strain U.K. welfare programs), a court may
declare them incompatible with the ECHR as domesticated via the Human
Rights Act.35 With that background of U.K. immigration law and rules in
mind, the discussion will now turn to the attempts of U.K. citizens and
residents to challenge immigration rules as violating the ECHR.
Beginning in the 1980s, European residents began challenging
immigration rules and decisions on the theory that they violated the ECHR.36
In Abdulazziz, the plaintiffs brought suit against the U.K. because the thenexisting immigration rules made it impossible for them, as lawful U.K.
residents born outside the U.K. or born to parents not born in the U.K., to
sponsor the entry of their husbands into the country.37 The Strasbourg Court
handed down a detailed opinion drawing a number of important conclusions
30

See BEVAN, supra note 28.
Id. at 47.
32
Id.
33
COLIN TURPIN & ADAM TOMPKINS, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: TEXT
AND MATERIALS 170–71 (7th ed. 2006) (discussing Secretary of State for the Home
Department v. Pankina, [2010] 3 WLR 1526).
34
Id. at 285–86 (discussing U.K. courts’ ability to review legislation challenged using the
Human Rights Act, and explaining that Section 6 establishes “it is unlawful for a public
authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right”).
35
Id. at 85 (discussing Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45,
[2008] 1 AC 385 and Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB, [2007] UKHL 46,
[2008] 1 AC 440 which held control orders issued pursuant to primary legislation direction
were excessive; and, therefore, thus disproportionate and contrary to the Human Rights Act).
36
See Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 471, 474
(1985) (alleging decisions by immigration officials made under then current rules violated
plaintiffs’ rights under Articles 3, 8, 13, and 14 of the ECHR).
37
Id. at 486–92.
31
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that aid in the understanding of how the ECHR interacts with domestic
immigration law.
First, the Strasbourg Court recognized that nothing in the ECHR applies
to non-citizens’ right to enter or remain in a participating country.38 The
Convention only requires participating countries to respect the human rights
described therein, and enact immigration protocols and laws that are in
accord with the Convention and that do not violate any of those prescribed
human rights.39 The Court reasoned that, because the complainants were
lawful residents “being deprived or threatened with deprivation of the society
of their spouses,” any domestic rules used to evaluate their applications to act
as sponsors must be in accord with the Convention.40
Second, the Court gave an early look into what was meant by “family
life” as used in Article 8 of the Convention.41 The Court acknowledged that
multiple definitions and interpretations of the word “family” may exist, but a
proper definition must “include the relationship that arises from a lawful and
genuine marriage . . . even if the family life of the kind referred to by the
[U.K.] government has not yet been fully established.”42 Therefore, “family”
under the ECHR does not necessarily have to conform to the definition given
under domestic immigration law, but instead has a definition unique to its
use in the Convention.
Third, the Abdulaziz decision notes that Article 8’s prohibition on public
officials’ arbitrary interference with one’s family life may include “positive
obligations inherent in an effective respect for family life.”43 While there
may in fact be positive obligations involved in respecting an individual’s
family life, the Court did not find that such obligations included respecting
someone’s right to sponsor a spouse married only after the resident-applicant
moved to the U.K.44
Fourth, despite finding Article 8 did not invalidate the rules at issue in
Abdulaziz, the Court did hold the rules violated the Convention when read in
combination with Article 14. Article 14 of the Convention requires all other
rights listed in the Convention be secured without discrimination on the basis
of sex, race, color, or religion.45 Because under the then-existing rules it was

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id. at 496.
Id.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 495–96.
Id. at 496.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 497–98.
ECHR, supra note 23, art. 14.
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significantly easier for a husband to sponsor a wife than for a wife to sponsor
a husband, the rules effectively denied women their right to respect for
family life more so than men.46 Finding such discrimination embedded in
the rules, the Court found the U.K. immigration rule violated the plaintiffs’
Article 8 right to respect for family life when viewed through the lens of
Article 14’s prohibition on discrimination.47 Because the Court in Abdulaziz
(1) recognizes a lawful resident can challenge an immigration rule on Article
8 grounds; (2) provides a glimpse at what “family life” means in the context
of the Convention; (3) recognizes domestic government might have positive
obligations to respect family life; and (4) invalidates a domestic immigration
rule for reasons related to Article 8 of the Convention, the Court’s decision is
crucial in understanding how the Strasbourg Court analyzes immigration
rules in light of the Convention.
The Strasbourg Court again addressed British immigration rules and
whether—and how—they interfere with rights guaranteed by the Convention
in O’Donoghue v. United Kingdom.48 This decision built upon the reasoning
of R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, a decision rendered by a
domestic U.K. court.49 In O’Donoghue, the Strasbourg Court was asked to
determine if a British immigration rule requiring all individuals subject to
immigration control to obtain a certificate of approval before marrying, and
further requiring each applicant, i.e., both members of a couple, to pay a fee
of £295.50 The applicants alleged this violated their right to marry and found
a family.51 While the government supported this rule by claiming it was
necessary to prevent sham marriages entered into for immigration benefits,
the Strasbourg Court found the rule disproportionately burdened certain
couples wishing to marry, regardless of the genuineness of the proposed
marriages.52 The Strasbourg Court took further issue with the certificate of
approval process because officials made application decisions without any
investigation into the genuineness of the proposed marriage.53 Because the
rule worked as a powerful disincentive to marriage and did not include a
requirement of investigation to further its goal of preventing sham marriages
aimed at obtaining a more favorable immigration status, the Strasbourg Court
46

Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 471, 503 (1985).
Id.
48
O’Donoghue v. United Kingdom, (2010) 53 EHRR 1.
49
Id.; R (on the applications of Balai and Others) v. Sec. of State for the Home Dep’t,
[2008] UKHL 53.
50
O’Donoghue v. United Kingdom, (2010) 53 EHRR at [24].
51
Id. at [60].
52
Id. at [89].
53
Id.
47

2015]

A HOUSE DIVIDED

515

held that the rule violated the applicants’ Article 12 guaranteed right to
marry.54
The Strasbourg Court again addressed an immigration rule’s validity
under the ECHR in Boultif v. Switzerland.55 The plaintiff in this case, an
Algerian national married to a Swiss citizen, was expelled from Switzerland
after the Swiss government denied his application to renew his residence
permit because he had been convicted of illegal weapons possession.56 The
plaintiff’s wife objected to being forced to follow her husband to Algeria.57
The government’s position, and that taken by the Swiss courts that reviewed
the plaintiff’s appeals to the denial of his residence renewal, was that the
expulsion was necessary to preserve public order and safety.58 While the
Strasbourg Court recognized ensuring public safety to be a legitimate
government interest, they found that responding to a concern about public
safety posed by a one-time offender did not properly balance the relevant
interests, and amounted to a violation of plaintiff’s Article 8 right to respect
for family life.59 The Strasbourg Court notably began its discussion of
whether or not there had, in fact, been a violation of Article 8 by explaining
that when determining whether or not an immigration law has violated the
ECHR, the Court is to balance the interest of the individual right on the one
hand and the prevention of the identified societal harm, or furtherance of
societal benefit, on the other.60 Thus, the Strasbourg Court made clear that
infringing on an individual right guaranteed by the ECHR is only tolerated
when the contracting government can show that the infringement is
outweighed by, and proportionate to, a legitimate government interest.

54

Id. at [91]–[92].
Boultif v. Switzerland, [2001] ECHR 497.
56
Id. at [6]–[14].
57
Id. at [16] (“[T]he applicant’s wife complained of being expected to follow her husband
to Algeria. While admitting that she spoke French, she claimed that she would have no work
in Algeria and no money. She found it most shocking that a married couple was being
separated.”).
58
Id. at [34] (“Given the offences which the applicant had committed in Switzerland, there
could be no doubt that the refusal not to renew the residence permit was called for in the
interests of public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime and for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.”).
59
Id. at [47]–[56] (“The Court is therefore of the opinion that the interference was not
proportionate to the aim pursued.”).
60
Id. at [47] (“Accordingly, the Court’s task consists in ascertaining whether in the
circumstances the refusal to renew the applicant’s residence permit struck a fair balance
between the relevant interests, namely the applicant’s right to respect for his family life, on the
one hand, and the prevention of disorder or crime, on the other.”).
55
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III. DOMESTIC IMMIGRATION HUMAN RIGHTS CASE LAW
When reviewing the validity of an immigration rule in light of human
rights set forth in the Convention, both common law domestic courts and the
Strasbourg Court must determine whether a given immigration rule’s
infringement on individuals’ right to family life is justified by the stated
government interest. The U.K. Supreme Court addressed the proportionality
of an immigration rule most recently in Quila v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department.61 In Quila, the Court was faced with determining
whether rules designed to prevent forced marriages interfered with a person’s
right to enjoy his or her family life as granted in Article 8 of the Human
Rights Act of 1998.62 The rule at issue in Quila prevented British citizens
under the age of twenty-one from sponsoring the entry of his or her spouse’s
entry into the country.63 The government’s stated purpose for this rule was
to prevent forced marriages.64 At issue before the Court was whether the ban
on sponsoring a spouse’s entry based purely on age was a legally proper way
to deal with the problem of forced marriage.65 The Court recognized that the
Home Office was justified in trying everything possible to prevent or inhibit
forced marriages, but held the rule arbitrarily infringed on the right of
citizens under age twenty-one to found a family life.66 The government cited
statistics demonstrating that 28% of all cases of forced marriages between
2005 and 2008 involved eighteen to twenty-year-olds, and argued the older
the individual, the better equipped he or she is likely to be to resist pressure
to enter a forced marriage.67 The critical question was why the need to
protect these vulnerable age groups from being forced into marriages
required a rule that interfered with the fundamental right of a far greater
number of people—namely, all eighteen to twenty-year-olds voluntarily
choosing to marry.68 The Court reasoned that because the number of
innocent applicants unfairly being forced to delay marriage, or cohabitation
after marriage, for up to three years was vastly more than the number of
forced marriages the rule would theoretically prevent or inhibit, the rule was

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Quila v. Sec. State for the Home Dep’t, [2011] UKSC 45, 1 A.C. 621 [50].
Id. at [1]–[2].
Id. at [7]–[8].
Id.
Id. at [1].
Id. at [4].
Id. at [10].
Id. at [62].
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a disproportionate infringement on the right to found a family life.69 The
Court wrote, for the State to make exile for one of the spouses the price of
exercising the right to marry and embark on family life requires powerful
justification.70
The U.K. Supreme Court found the government did not meet its burden of
proving that the possibility of frustrating a small number of forced marriages
justified intruding on the guaranteed right to make a reality of living together
as a married couple. Quila is important because it shows that domestic
British courts, in reviewing immigration rules and their conflicts with Article
8 rights, are not merely inquiring into whether or not there is some rational
link between the public interest and a given immigration rule supporting an
intrusion on individual rights. Instead, British courts must investigate
whether or not an immigration rule’s interference with an individual’s right
to family life is proportional to the public interest. If the public interest is
marginal, or the interest is only furthered by the immigration rule marginally,
and the infringement on an individual’s right to family life is substantial, the
rule cannot be maintained.
The case of R, which was heard in domestic court, dealt with an
immigration rule requiring marriage certificates of approval for individuals
who were subject to immigration control.71 The House of Lords, sitting as
the highest U.K. Court at the time, found the law was discriminatory and
disproportionately interfered with the right to marry.72 Lord Bingham noted
that countries have every right to establish rules and policies aimed at
preventing marriages of convenience, but this ability to regulate is not
without limits.73 Specifically, the Court noted tying one’s ability to marry to
one’s ability to pay a pre-determined fee was in direct conflict with Article
12 as it may “impair the essence of the right to marry.”74 Read together,
domestic cases like Quila and R and Strasbourg cases like Abdulaziz,
O’Donoghue, and Boultif establish important principles of analysis for
immigration rules promulgated by parties to the ECHR. Both domestic
courts and the Strasbourg Court are open to applicants’ appeals of
immigration rules on human rights grounds, and in recent years—especially
69
Id. at [58]–[62] (“What seems clear is that the number of unforced marriages which it
obstructs from their intended development for up to three years vastly exceeds the number of
forced marriages which it deters.”).
70
Id. at [54].
71
R (on the applications of Balai and Others) v. Sec. of State for the Home Dep’t, [2008]
UKHL 53.
72
Id. at [32].
73
Id. at [29].
74
Id. at [30].
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the last five to ten years—have been using human rights doctrine to
aggressively check the power of immigration rules harshly impacting
immigrant families who wish to live and marry in the U.K.
IV. CURRENT IMMIGRATION RULES: FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
SPONSORING A FOREIGN FAMILY MEMBER’S ENTRY INTO THE
UNITED KINGDOM
MM concerns current financial requirements placed on U.K. residents
seeking to sponsor the entry of a foreign spouse, or the entry of a foreign
spouse and children.75 The intent of the government in passing these rules in
July 2012 is presented in a detailed statement issued by the Home Office
when the rule was promulgated.76 The stated purpose of these financial
requirements is to ensure relationships benefitting from immigration are not
false, and to limit the impact of immigrants on taxpayers.77 The Statement of
Intent introduces and explains the financial requirements in a list of
particular methods to be used in the government’s attempts to curtail the
effects of immigration on the welfare system.78 Second, the Statement of
Intent clearly establishes the income minimums that will apply to all
residents seeking to apply to sponsor a family member’s visa.79
Moreover, the Statement of Intent specifically addresses Article 8 and
how it interacts with the new immigration rules.80 These new immigration
rules, according to the Home Office, are meant to create a system where
candidates are judged based on predetermined and easily identifiable
characteristics.81 Further, the new rules are meant to combine case law
discussing Article 8 with immigration policy so that the Border Agency is

75

See supra Part I.
HOME OFFICE, STATEMENT OF INTENT: FAMILY MIGRATION (2012), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/257359/soi-f
am-mig.pdf.
77
Id. at [16] (“[O]ur approach under the new Immigration Rules will ensure that there is a
clear focus on whether the relationship is genuine, that the sponsor can properly support their
partner and any dependants financially. . . .”).
78
Id. at [17] (“In particular, we will set a minimum income threshold of £18,600 to sponsor
the settlement in the UK of a non-EEA partner. . . . The relevant minimum income threshold
will apply at every application stage: entry clearance/leave to remain, further leave to remain
and indefinite leave to remain (settlement).”).
79
Id.
80
Id. at [28]–[69].
81
Id. at [31].
76
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able to evaluate applications in light of existing Article 8 case law.82
According to the Home Office, the new immigration rules, including the
income minimums required for sponsorship, are proportionate and serve the
public interest by ensuring immigrants do not threaten the economic wellbeing of the U.K.83 The Home Office stresses the new rules’ focus on
balancing the demands of Article 8, as established by both the Strasbourg
Court and domestic courts, with the demands of running an economically
viable country.84
While the Statement of Intent declares that only cases with extreme
circumstances will need to be adjudicated before the court, just one year after
the rules went into effect an administrative court was forced to review the
proportionality of the newly enacted income minimums required to sponsor
the entry of a foreign family member.85 Thus, while the Statement of Intent
is clearly well-intentioned and means to show that the government has in fact
recognized the convergence of Article 8 and immigration rules, the recent
litigation in this area indicates the government’s good faith attempts at curing
defects in the immigration rules may have interfered with individuals’ human
rights.
V. CURRENT RULES AND EXISTING CASE LAW
The Statement of Intent accompanying the July 2012 immigration rules
explains that the financial requirement rule aims to create a regime in which
individuals applying to sponsor a family member must meet the “clear,
transparent requirements on the face of the rules.”86 The U.K. government
states these clear, transparent requirements are necessary to solve the public
policy vacuum that was facing immigration courts prior to the challenges.87
The problem was that courts were charged with the task of determining
whether or not a given immigration rule applied to a specific set of facts, was
disproportionate in light of the rights protected by Article 8, but were not
82
Id. (“The new Immigration Rules will unify consideration under the rules and Article 8,
by defining the basis on which a person can enter or remain in the UK on the basis of their
family or private life.”).
83
Id.
84
Id. at [33] (“The requirements of the new Immigration Rules will themselves reflect the
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given any information about what public interests weighed in favor of
infringing on an individual’s right to family life.88 The changes in the rules
represent the government’s attempt to give direction to courts analyzing
whether a rule violates Article 8 by presenting judges with rules designed to
strike the appropriate balance between individual rights and public policy
concerns.89 So, while the old rules tasked courts with determining whether a
specific application of a specific rule ran afoul of Article 8, the new scheme
tasks courts with determining whether a given rule itself runs afoul of Article
8.90
Not only have the immigration rules’ substantive content changed, but
perhaps more importantly, the way in which courts approach cases where
immigration rules are challenged has likewise been modified. As the
government explains in its Statement of Intent, if a court finds the application
of a rule infringes on an individual’s right to private and family life in a
manner disproportionate to the public interest, the whole rule is in jeopardy
and may be struck down as a violation of Article 8.91
Abdulaziz, O’Donoghue, and Boultif are cases in which the Strasbourg
Court held domestic immigration laws violated in whole or part Article 8 of
the ECHR. Based on this case law, the financial requirements currently
burdening British citizens hoping to live in the U.K. with a foreign national
spouse are likewise violations of Article 8’s guaranteed right to respect for
private and family life. Because the Strasbourg Court recognized “family
life” as it’s used in the Convention, the term includes, at a minimum, the
relationship formed by a genuine marriage.92 The government of a party
state, like the U.K., has a positive duty to not arbitrarily interfere with a
lawful resident’s ability to enter into a genuine marriage.93 Under Abdulaziz,
party has an inherent obligation to respect lawful residents’ right to found a
family via genuine marriage.94 Thus, the current financial threshold
applicants must meet in order to sponsor a spouse’s entry into the country at
some level infringes on their Article 8 rights. The relevant question then
becomes, is this infringement justified by and proportional to the public
policy it claims to further? If the answer is no, and the harm caused by the
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interference with the right to found a family is far greater than the good that
will be achieved by the rule, the rule cannot stand.
The Strasbourg Court’s opinion in O’Donoghue sheds even more light on
the conflict between the current financial threshold and the ECHR. Because
the rule at issue in O’Donoghue imposed a fee on immigrants seeking to get
married, the Strasbourg Court held the rule created an impediment to
marriage, a right guaranteed by Article 12.95 Further, because marriage is a
relationship which forms family life, the rule also failed to respect family
life, as mandated by Article 8.96 The purpose of the rule, according to the
government, was to deter marriages entered into solely for immigration
benefits.97 The government reasoned that the fee would weed out those
marrying for convenience, and only those who truly wished to marry would
bother to proceed with marriage and pay the fee.98 Because the rule imposed
a financial burden on all immigrants trying to marry without any
investigation into whether or not the marriage was in fact genuine or a sham,
the Strasbourg Court found the rule disproportionate.99 The interference with
marriage and family life was not proportional to the public interest of
preventing sham marriages.100 O’Donoghue shows that the Strasbourg Court
views rules that financially burden immigrants as suspect. Without sufficient
justification from the government showing what legitimate aim the burden
will actually further, a rule using a financial burden as a tool to effectuate
public policy goals unduly burdens individuals when it interferes with a right
guaranteed by the ECHR.
The income threshold at issue in this Note is likewise a financial burden
placed indiscriminately on all immigrants and immigrant spouses, and is
therefore suspect. The rule is only a valid intrusion on the right of
individuals to live together as a family if the threshold is truly going to
further a public policy goal, and will further that goal without burdening
British citizens and lawful residents who pay into the welfare system. The
current financial minimums exist for two reasons. First, the government
wants to prevent individuals benefitting from sham marriages. Second, the
government does not want immigration to lead to an increase in the number
of people asking for public assistance. The government must be able to
show that the threshold is set so that it captures those who are entering sham
95
96
97
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99
100

See O’Donoghue v. United Kingdom, (2010) 53 EHRR 1; ECHR, supra note 23, arts. 8, 12.
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marriages or would be asking for public funds, while also allowing
individuals in genuine marriages who will not need public assistance to
sponsor the entry of spouses and other family members.
Finally, the Strasbourg Court’s decision in Boultif underscores the recent
focus on proportionality. The Swiss government breached its duty of respect
for family life by expelling Mr. Boultif from Switzerland following a
conviction for illegal weapons possession and aggravated assault, despite the
fact this meant his wife, a Swiss citizen, would be forced to follow him to his
native Algeria.101 Because Mr. Boultif had not had any other legal issues, he
was released from prison early because of exemplary behavior and had job
prospects in Switzerland that the Court found satisfactory. Despite this, the
burden of forcing Mr. Boultif’s Swiss wife to move to a foreign country in
order to preserve her family was severe.102 Because of the discrepancy
between the infringement on individual rights and the potential public benefit
of that infringement, the Court held the rule disproportionate.103
Boultif shows that the main consideration when determining whether or
not a given immigration rule violates Article 8 is to balance the harm to the
individual right with the benefit the interference will produce. Applying this
test to the financial minimums at issue here, the government must be able to
prove that the financial minimum requirements will actually prevent an
increase in families with immigrant members calling on public welfare
assistance or inhibit more sham marriages than genuine marriages. If the
financial minimums will not prevent these feared increases or stop an
increase already observed, then there is no justification for infringing on
lawful residents’ and citizens’ right to marry and found a family with the
person of their choosing.
Additionally, domestic case law also supports the conclusion that the
current financial requirements for sponsoring a foreign national spouse
unjustifiably interfere with British citizens’ right to respect for family life. In
Quila, the British Supreme Court held invalid an immigration rule
prohibiting British citizens under age twenty-one from sponsoring a spouse’s
entry into the country because it arbitrarily infringed on rights guaranteed by
the Human Rights Act.104 The Quila Court noted that the government
interest in preventing forced marriages was valid.105 Likewise, preventing an
increase in immigrant families seeking welfare assistance—the government
101
102
103
104
105
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Id. at [45].

2015]

A HOUSE DIVIDED

523

interest lying behind the financial requirements—is also valid.106 However,
also like the immigration rule at issue in Quila, the financial requirements at
issue here arguably burden far more individuals who will not end up seeking
government assistance than those individuals who would seek assistance if
admitted into the country.107 Further, the Quila Court took issue with the
fact that the rule was applied with no investigation into the genuineness of
these young people’s marriages. Similarly, the financial requirement rule is
extremely exclusionary and provides for no investigation into the actual
financial situation of an applicant. For example, there is no allowance for
family financial assistance that might help an applicant meet the threshold
requirement.
Both the law at issue in Quila and the instant financial requirement rule
use raw numbers to make decisions impacting a person’s right to found a
family. While lines must be drawn when operating a large and complex
bureaucratic immigration system, Quila points out that these numerical lines
must be narrowly tailored to the government interest being pursued so as not
to overtly infringe on guaranteed human rights. Rules infringing on these
rights must be carefully applied so as not to burden individuals who are not
contributing to the problem the rule itself is seeking to rectify.
The current financial requirements are arguably worse infringements on
the right to found a family than was the age limit placed on marriages in
Quila. First, the Quila rule’s burden and the financial requirement burden
are not nearly the same. It is a fact of life that everyone ages. An eighteenyear-old impacted by the Quila rule would be able, after waiting a few years,
to sponsor the entry of his or her spouse. While the court properly found that
mandating that waiting period was disproportionate to the government’s end
goal, the burden on an individual’s right was not permanent. The financial
rule at issue here, however, is much more likely to be permanent. Some
individuals may never have a job paying a yearly income over £18,600. And
while there is a provision allowing for personal savings to make up for lack
of yearly income, it could take well over three years for a lower-income
individual to save the required £16,000 necessary to overcome falling below
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See MM, [2013] EWHC (Admin.) 1900, [110] (“The Secretary of State is entitle to
conclude the economic and social welfare of the whole community is promoted by measures
that require spouses to be maintained at a somewhat higher level than the bare subsistence
level set under previous interpretations of the rules.”).
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See UK’s New Visa Rules ‘Causing Anguish’ for Families, supra note 4.
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the income threshold.108 The burden struck down in Quila is clearly less
intense than the burden imposed by the current financial requirements.
In addition to the Quila decision, the House of Lords decision in the case
of R supports the conclusion that the current financial requirements for
spousal sponsorship are invalid infringements on the right to respect for
family life. While the Supreme Court held the R law invalid under Article
12, which guarantees the right to marry, and not Article 8, the right to respect
for family life, the decision is still illustrative of how a domestic court should
analyze a human rights challenge to an immigration rule. As the court in R
noted, “[t]he Strasbourg authorities have not in practice upheld the right to
found a family with the same firmness they have shown in upholding the
right to marry.”109 Thus, where the right to respect for family life is at issue,
U.K. courts recognize the most strenuous review is required.
In R, the House of Lords inquired into whether requiring a couple subject
to immigration control (whether one party or both) to pay a fee in order to
obtain a marriage certificate violated an individual’s right to marry. The
Court held this fee was unnecessary for furthering the state’s goal of
preventing marriages of convenience.110 Just as that Court held a financial
limit unrelated to the government’s interest in enacting an immigration rule
was an invalid infringement on the right to marry, the financial requirements
at issue here must be held invalid if they are not directly related to the
government’s goal of preventing new immigrants burdening the welfare
system. A financial burden cannot be placed on an individual for no reason.
There must a legitimate purpose for the burden.
VI. PROPORTIONALITY OF CURRENT FINANCIAL MINIMUMS
An expanding definition of family life means British immigration laws
must be cognizant of the myriad forms a family’s life may take. Because the
duty to recognize respect for family life is an important human right, the
British government must also take care to craft immigration rules that further
108

See Immigration Rules, supra note 1 (explaining an applicant who does not meet the
standard £18,600 gross annual income requirement may, in the alternative, meet the
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public policy goals that only infringe on individuals’ right to found a family
in an amount proportional to the public policy interest being pursued, such as
ensuring new immigrants do not place an added burden on taxpayer funded
welfare assistance programs. There must be safeguards in immigration rules
allowing for British families of all types to live in the U.K. This means an
immigration rule setting a strict financial requirement is over-inclusive.
Under the framework presented by the U.K. government in their 2012
Statement of Intent, all immigration rules should be proportional to the
public policy objectives identified by the government.111 Here, that means
that the financial minimums must be proportional to the goal of ensuring that
immigrants joining British family members in the U.K. are not doing so at
the expense of British taxpayers. Because the financial minimums currently
required do not vary based on any case-specific circumstances, the rule is
arguably over broad and not proportional. The Statement of Intent explains
the financial minimum requirement was set at £18,600 because that is the
average income at which a couple is no longer eligible for government
assistance.112 While immigration caseworkers do have the ability to make
further inquiries or request further information if the threshold requirement
appears to be met,113 they “have no discretion or flexibility with regard to the
level of the financial requirement.”114 It is also noteworthy that the
paragraph explaining a caseworker’s discretion to request further information
focuses exclusively on situations in which the caseworker is suspicious the
applicant has somehow appeared to meet the requirement, but in fact has
not.115 The government, by the structure of its Statement of Intent, appears
to be working under the assumption that applicants will attempt to forge the
111
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record of their financial status. Given that a caseworker has no discretion to
investigate applications falling just under the threshold, it is unsurprising
there would be those who might stretch the truth of their financial situation in
an attempt to sponsor the entry of a spouse.
The current financial minimum requirement rule does not allow all British
citizens to exercise their right to found a family, denies that right in an
arbitrary manner, and is thus a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR. As the
Strasbourg Court noted in MM, “it would be difficult to exercise . . . the right
to found a family if there are serious obstacles to matrimonial
cohabitation.”116 The current rule applies indiscriminately and leaves little to
no room for Home Department officials to inquire into an applicant’s
financial status. Decisions of both British and European courts show a
preference for a more individualized review of immigration cases.117 The
current financial requirements for sponsoring a spouse’s entry into the U.K.
leave no room for discretion, which can be a useful device for successfully
protecting human rights while also furthering government policy goals.
While the stated government interests are unquestionably valid, the
government bears the burden of proving those goals are being furthered with
narrowly tailored policies. Going forward, European courts should continue
to require parties to the ECHR to carefully draft immigration legislation
impacting families’ ability to live together, and review such legislation with
a sharp eye. While these courts have not said this explicitly, it is reasonable
to infer they are moving toward a doctrine of least restrictive means.
VII. CRITICISM OF MM V. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HOME DEPARTMENT
As addressed above, the case of MM is meant to serve as the basis for a
discussion about the current conflicts between British immigration laws and
the ECHR. Now that the framework for analyzing immigration rules and the
Human Rights Act has been presented, the MM decision can be properly
evaluated. The 2012 immigration rules, including the financial requirements
at issue in MM and at issue in this Note, were drafted with Article 8 case law
in mind.118 The administrative court that heard MM held the financial
116
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requirements to be valid, but also recognized the merit of the plaintiffs’
claim.119 While the court notes that the government is pursuing legitimate
goals by using financial requirements to limit the number of immigrants
seeking taxpayer-funded welfare, the court’s decision can be criticized for
incorrectly analyzing the financial requirements’ burdens and benefits.
First, the court determined that the law is not using the least restrictive
means possible.120 As explained, this is the standard currently governing any
party state’s immigration rules interfering with an individual’s right to form a
family of his or her choosing, or I would argue, interfering with any right
guaranteed by the ECHR. Discussing the financial requirements for
supporting a foreign national spouse, the court concluded: “[T]aken together
they [the financial requirements] are more than is necessary to promote the
legitimate aim.”121 For instance, Justice Blake, writing for the court,
admonishes the Secretary of State for using such an inflexible rule when the
right of a lawful citizen to live in their home country with their spouse is at
stake.122 The court suggests using a twelve-month review process in order to
ensure the financial standing an applicant claimed on his or her application is
reflected in reality.123 Additionally, the opinion points out that the £18,600 is
well above the annual gross income someone would earn working for
minimum wage forty hours per week.124 The court notes the alternative
method available for proving financial stability—using personal savings—is
a substantial burden, and in most cases will require an individual show
savings in excess of the standard £18,600 requirement.125
Second, the court explains in detail that the current financial requirement
is disproportionate to the government’s stated aims.126 The Statement of
119
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Intent for the financial requirements at issue explicitly gives the court the
power to evaluate the proportionality of the new immigration rules.127 The
court notes that an administrative court may not be the proper place for “a
full blown merits review of policies,” but that does not preclude the court
from finding rules disproportionate and thus invalid under both domestic and
European Union case law.128 The court recognizes that requiring a financial
minimum of £18,600 is excessive and unattainable for many citizens and
refugees who may wish to live in the U.K. with their spouse.129 The U.K.
Earnings Index listed 422 occupations in its 2011 edition, and only 301 of
these occupations earned a yearly salary of or above £18,600.130 If the
current rule had been in use in 2009, forty-five percent of the sponsors who
applied would have been denied.131
However, the opinion fails to do what earlier domestic and Strasbourg
Court precedent allow courts to do–strike laws down as invalid when they
are disproportionate. Instead, the MM Court expressly refused to quash the
financial requirements Plaintiffs claimed violated their right to respect for
family life.132 The Court reasoned that the Secretary of State for the Home
Department—and not the Court—should determine what financial thresholds
best further the government’s interest in controlling immigration.133
Rather than leaving British courts to handle appeals when applicants wish
to contest the Border Agency’s decision, the rules should be structured so
that Home Department officials have the ability to assess whether or not
denying an applicant’s request to sponsor rises to the level of an Article 8
violation. As currently written, the rules do not give any discretion to the
officials actually reviewing applications to make exceptions or inquire into
the reasons why a given applicant may be unable to meet the financial
requirements.134 While the rules claim to encapsulate Article 8 standards, to
have balanced, on the front end, individual human rights against the interests
life. In terms of the Strasbourg approach they do not represent a fair balance between the
competing interests and fall outside the margin of appreciations or discretionary area of
judgment available in policy making in this sphere of administration.”).
127
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of the state, the case of MM shows that many people who have a right live in
the U.K. with a spouse will be denied under the current rules. For example,
one of the plaintiffs in MM, Shabana Javed, is a British citizen whose local
job center only offers jobs paying salaries less than £18,000.135 Ms. Javed
lives in what she describes as an “economically and socially deprived” area
of Birmingham, England.136 The rules provide no exceptions for someone
like Ms. Javed who has limited living expenses because of family support
and whose husband, given his qualifications, would have a better chance than
Ms. Javed at finding employment.137 The Court’s refusal to quash the rules
because some applications decided under the current rules will be compatible
with Article 8 cannot be reconciled with the precedent of Quila, R,
O’Donoghue and other cases discussed within this Note. Justice Bradley
recognizes, “national economic and social data demonstrate that complying
with these new measures will be particularly difficult for many members of
the ethnic minority communities and female sponsors where income levels
have been consistently lower than national averages . . .” and further notes,
“[t]he income figure is set at a level to make provision for a national average
for rented accommodation or mortgage repayment, even though house prices
and rental costs vary dramatically throughout the country.”138 A rule that has
the known potential to violate an individual’s right to family life cannot be
sustained.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In Abdulaziz, the Strasbourg Court made this comment on Article 8 and
the duties it imposes on states bound the terms of the ECHR: “The duty
imposed by article 8 cannot be considered as extending to a general
obligation on the part of a contracting state to respect the choice by married
couples of the country of their matrimonial residence and to accept the nonThis is a perfectly
national spouses for settlement in that country.”139
reasonable statement, and one that makes practical sense for any country
with a modern immigration system. Of course country A does not owe an
unlimited, general duty to a couple from country B who wishes to live in
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country A. For practical reasons, there must be limits on when and who may
enter a country.
These limits, however, must not offend guaranteed human rights.
Additionally, rules promulgated to make entry clearance decisions both
efficient and uniform are obviously desirable when running a large
bureaucratic institution, such as the British immigration system, for example.
Nevertheless, this goal does not justify using overly exclusionary financial
requirements as an entrance test. The £18,600 financial threshold British
citizens must meet in order to sponsor a spouse’s entry is unnecessarily harsh.
While any immigration application decision resulting in an entry denial is
going to cause someone anguish, the current financial threshold places an
undue burden on undeserving citizens—a result prohibited by Article 8 of the
ECHR. An exclusionary rule that will overly burden the young (who are often
students), citizens living in areas with lower costs of living, and Britons living
in ethnic minority communities140 cannot stand. Such a rule is not narrowly
tailored to the government’s stated means: prevention of further burdening the
country’s welfare system. By not using the least restrictive means necessary,
the rule stands in the way of a person’s right to found a family, and does so, for
many people, without a legitimate aim.
The decision to deny an application for sponsoring a foreign national
spouse based on the income level of the spouse living in the U.K. requires an
individualized review of the type advocated for in the British Supreme Court
in Quila. Inquiry into the sufficiency of financial resources would serve a
dual purpose. First, it would prevent the exclusion of foreign spouses who
do not, in fact, place any additional burden on British taxpayers. Second, it
would accurately further the government’s stated interests by preventing the
entry of spouses who would run a high risk of seeking welfare assistance.
While the court in MM claimed it would be “inappropriate” to strike down
the financial rules,141 under existing case law this decision was wrong. The
court, exercising judicial review, should have followed the precedent
recognized in the opinion and held the rules as written are inherently
disproportionate and thus violate the European Convention on Human
Rights.
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